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Despite the fact that efforts to identify it empirically have largely been futile, the liquidity effect
plays a central role in conventional monetary theory and policy. Recently, however, an
increasing volume of empirical work [Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992a,b), Christiano,,
Eichenbaum and Evans (1994a,b) and Strongin (1995)] has supported the existence of a
statistically significant and economically important liquidity effect when nonborrowed reserves
is used as the indicator of monetary policy. This paper shows that there is an identification
problem associated with using nonborrowed reserves. Specifically, the strong negative
relationship between nonborrowed reserves and the funds rate can stem from the presence or
absence of a liquidity effect. The paper points out how changes in the demand for borrowed
reserves can be used to identify whether the relationship between nonborrowed reserves and the
funds rate is due to liquidity effect. The evidence presented suggests that the “liquidity effect”
that Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans and others have identified is actually due to the interest
sensitivity of the demand for borrowed reserves and the definition linking nonborrowed and
borrowed reserves. Consequently, the evidence suggests that the liquidity effect is nil.
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Business School, City University, LONDON.The liquidity effect—the transient yet persistent declines in real and nominal short-term
interest rates associated with unanticipated expansionary monetary policy shocks—plays a
central role in conventional monetary theory and policy.1 Despite its prominent role,the liquidity
effect has receivedscant empirical support [Cagan and Gandolfi (1969), Melvin(1983),
Thornton (1988b), Reichenstein(1987) and Leeper and Gordon (1992)]. Anumber ofanalysts
[Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1991, 1992a,b) and Goodfriend
(1991)] have argued, however, that the lackofempirical support is a manifestation ofthe Fed’s
attachment to interest ratetargeting in one form oranother [Goodfriend (1991)]. They argue that
innovations to monetary aggregates, suchas Ml, the adjusted monetary base or total reserves,
reflect shocks to money demand ratherthan to money supply. Consequently, the inability of
researchers to isolate a statistically significant and economically relevantliquidity effect stems
from theirfailure to correctly identify theexogenous policy actions ofthe Fed.
Recently, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1991, 1992b), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(1994a,b) and Strongin (1995) have argued that nonborrowedreserves reflectthe exogenous
policy actions ofthe Fed.2 Using nonborrowed reserves and Vectorautoregression (VAR), they
find a liquidity effect that is both statistically significant and economically important. Recently,
however, Pagan and Robertson (1995) and Christiano (1995) have shov:n that the liquidity effect
identified in this way vanishes aftertheearly 1980s.
This papershows that there is an identificationproblem associated with using
nonborrowed reserves as an indicator ofmonetary policy and shows how changes in the demand
See Thornton (l988b), Reichenstein (1987) and Paganand Robertson(1995),
2
SinceChristiano and Eichenbaum use a VAR methodology, itis morepreciselycorrect to say that theyuse exogenous shocks tononborrowed
reserves. Mostoftheirempirical work,however, is motivated bya simple statistical analysisofthe relationshipbetweennonborrowed reserves and
thefunds rate. I take the same libertylater andinitially focus on therelationshipbetween nonborrowedreserves and thefunds rate. Later the
analysisfocuseson shocks to nonborrowed reserves using aVAR model similar to that ofChristiano andEichenbaum (1991, 1 992b) and
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (I 994a,b).Identifying the Liquidity Effect: The Case ofNonborrowed Reserves Page 2
forborrowed reserves can be used to identify the liquidity effect using nonborrowed reserves.
Specifically, it shows how the negative relationshipbetween nonborrowed reserves and the
federal funds rate may result from either the presenceoral5sence ofa liquidity effect.3
Furthermore, it shows how changes in the demand forborrowedreserves can be used to identify
which ofthesealternatives account for the relationship between nonborrowed reserves and the
funds rate.
The evidencepresented here suggests that the negative association between nonborrowed
reserves and the funds rate that Thornton (l988a), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1991, 1992a,b),
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (l994a,b), Strongin (1995) and Pagan and Robertson (1995)
report, stems from the absence, ratherthan thepresence, ofa statistically significant and
economicallyimportant liquidity effect. Also, the evidence suggests that the liquidity effect did
not changein the early 1980s, as Pagan and Robertson (1995) and Christiano (1995) suggest, but
rather that itnever existed.
I. Nonborrowed Reserves, Borrowingandthe Liquidity Effect
The liquidity effect associated with nonborrowed reserves is motivated by the market for
reserves. The demand forreserves is derived from reserve requirements imposed on certain
deposit liabilities ofbanks.4 Banks’ demand for such deposits is assumed to be inversely related
to a short-terminterest rate, i, representing the opportunity cost ofholding such deposits. Hence,
so too is banks’ demand forreserves. That is,
3
This point has also been made by Coleman.Gilles and Labadie(1995).
4
Note that thedemand for something called reserveslikely would arise endogenously ifreserve requirements werenot imposed by theFed. In
this case,however, the nature ofreserves andtheir relationshipto bank liabilitiesmight bequite different from those imposed by the central bank.Identifying the Liquidity Effect: The Case ofNonborrowed Reserves Page 3
(I) Rd = tf(i), f’ 0,
where f(i) denotes the demand for reservable bank liabilities and ‘rdenotes the marginal reserve
requirement. For convenience assume that reserves are congruent with the monetary base and




Borrowed reserves are supplied when the Fed makes loans to banks at the discount
window. Thedemand for borrowedreserves depends on the spread between the federal funds
rate, i~,and the discount rate, ~d’and on otherfactors, ~3•6That is,
(3) BR = + h(i1. — ‘d)’ h ‘ 0; f3 0.
Equations 1, 2 and 3 are combined to obtain the reserve market equilibrium condition,
(4) ‘rJ(i) = B1
++ h(i~.
To close what can be thought ofas thereserve blockofthe credit market it is necessary to
havea relationship that links the federal fundsrate and the short-terminterest rate. Forthis
SIn thismodel, changes in nonborrowed reserves arecongruent with openmarket operations; however,this is not true in a model that allows for
othersources ofreserves.
~Thedegree ofadministrationofthe discount window haschanged over time. SeeGoodfriend (1983), Thornton (1986) and Cosimano and
Sheehan (1994) for discussions ofthe discount window.Identifying the Liquidity Effect: The Case ofNonborrowed Reserves Page 4
purpose, we assume the following condition holds,
(5) 0(i1
, i) = 0,
where 01 and 02 are opposite in sign, so that di/di = -02/01 > 0. Equation 5 can be thought ofas
an arbitrage condition and implies nothing about thecausality between the rates.7
The reserve block has three endogenous variables, ii-, ~. and Bf, but only two equations.
Causality is established by assuming one of thevariables is exogenous with respect to the others.
In manydiscussions ofmonetary policy [Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Cook and Hahn (1989),
Laurent (1988) and Goodfriend (1991)] attention is focused on shocksto the fundsrate causing
changes in other interest rates. This causal ordering is imposed by assuming that ii-, or
equivalently Bf, is exogenous. Since policy is implementedthrough open market operations, Bf
willbe taken to be exogenous.8 The resulting liquidity effect is
(6) ahaB1
= 01(O1tf ‘ + 02h’y1.
Note that f’ <0 is insufficientfor a liquidity effect. Forexample, ifthe discount window
were open, banks would be freeto meet theirreservedemand atthe discount window, the
exogenous declinein reserves would be offset by an endogenous rise in borrowing, i.e., h’—~
7
Equation 5 could bethought ofasthe expectedvalueofanarbitrage condition that must hold on average.i.e., O(i,,i) = ~wherethe E( )= 0.
Note too that thefunction 0 need not belinear. If it were,however, Equation5 could bethoughtofas acointegration relationship. There is some
evidencethat the federal fitnds rateand short-term interest rates, like the 3-month T-bill rate, arecointegrated,e.g.. Garfinkel andThornton (1995).
8
The resultsare the samewhether i,or B, is taken to beexogenous. Ifthe fundsrate is exogenous then B, must change endogenously by the
amount requiredto change thefundsrate target by the desired amount. Indeed,Bemanke and Blinder (1992) report that the results are similar
whethershocks to the funds rate orshocks to nonborrowed reserves are taken as theindicatorofmonetary policy.Identifying the Liquidity Effect: The Case ofNonborrowed Reserves Page 5
implies that a~/aBf =
This resultstems from the fact that an open market operation that fails to change total
reserves cannot affect interest rates. After accounting forthe effect of borrowed reserves,
nonborrowed and total reserves contain thesame information relevantfor identifying the
liquidity effect. That an empirically important liquidity effect can be identified only using
nonborrowed reserves is, primafacie, a reason to question whether it is theliquidity effect that
has been identified.’°
A. The Relationship Between Nonborrowed Reservesand InterestRates
When There IsNo Liquidity Effect
Now consider the relationshipbetween nonborrowedreserves and the federal funds rate
when there is no possibility fora liquidity effect. Assume that short-term interest rates are
exogenous to Fed actions [Coleman, Gilles and Labadie (l995)])1 This assumption means the
relationshipbetweennonborrowed reserves and the federal funds rate is determinedby howthe
Fed reacts to exogenous changes in interest rates. This canbe determinedby differentiating the
reserve market equilibrium condition, which yields theFed’s reaction function, namely,
/ , —~1
(7) dB1 Idi = (O1tf + 02h) O~
9
The responsiveness ofdiscount windowborrowing to policy induced changes in tbeinterest rate played acentral role in the so-calledfree
reserves controversy [e.g., Meigs (1962)] andthedifferenceofopinionbetween Friedman(1960) and Samuelson (1960)abouttherelevancy ofthe
discount window to theconduct ofmonetary policy.
0
Hence, the fact thatChristiano andEichenbaum (1991) findapositive associationbetween total reserves andthe federal funds rate is itself
primaJacie evidence against the liquidity effect. This observation also has been made byColeman,Gilles and Labadie(1995).
“Coleman, Gilles and Labadie(1995) assumethere is no causal relationshipbetween open market operations and interestrates. Intheirmodel,
however.i = i,. Hence, they assumethat the interest rate is determinedindependent ofdiscount window operations orthe supplyofreserves. In
thismodel, however,the fundsrate is determined independentlyofthe short-term interestrate, subjectonly to thearbitrage condition. Thornton
(1993) arguesthat the Fed’s influenceon the supplyofcredit is exaggerated by itspresence in thefunds market. Granger causality tests in
Garfinkeland Thornton (1995) suggest that neither the federal funds orthree-month bill T-ratessatisfy the necessary conditions for causality
running from onerate to the other. Consequently, it would appear that eitherofthecharacterizations presentedabove maybe extreme.Identifying the Liquidity Effect: The Case of Nonborrowed Reserves Page 6
A sufficient condition forthe absenceofa liquidity effect is f’= 0. Inthis case, Equation 7 can be
rewritten as,
(8) dB1/di = (02/01)h’ < 0.
Inthe absence ofa liquidity effect, the negative association between interest rates and
nonborrowed reserves stems directly from the Fed offsettinginterest-induced changes in
borrowing. This is plausible because theTrading Deskof the FederalReserve Bank ofNew
Yorkestimates the demand forreserves and each day supplies the reserves it believes are
necessary to meet the demand. Estimates ofreservedemand are slow to change, while
information on theprevious day’s borrowing is available eachday. Therefore, theremay be a
tendency for the Fed to adjust to changes in borrowing in an attempt to supply the projected level
ofreserves demanded. Moreover, the Fed has followed this procedure whether it was targeting
the federal fundsrate ornonborrowedreserves. Consequently, it should be invariant across time.
II. IdentifyingtheLiquidity Effect Through
theDemandfor BorrowedReserves
The above analysisshows that evidence aboutwhetherthe relationship between the
federal funds rate and nonborrowed reserves is due to thepresenceorabsence ofthe liquidity
effect can be obtained by seeing how therelationship changes with changes in the demandfor
borrowedreserves. Ifthe relationshipbetween the federal funds rate and nonborrowedreserves
is due to a liquidity effect, itwill become stronger the smaller is h’. Indeed, the liquidity effect is
largest when h’ = 0, oralternatively, if the discount window were closed.’2
2
lndeed, this isthereason that Friedman(1959) advocated closing thediscount window.Identifying the Liquidity Effect: The Case ofNonborrowed Reserves Page 7
Conversely,if thenegative relationshipbetween nonborrowed reserves and the funds rate
is due to theabsence ofthe liquidity effect, Equation 8 indicates that theassociation between
nonborrowed reserves and the fundsrate will become weaker, the smaller is h ~. Indeed, there
would be no relationship if the discountwindow were closed.
A. The Data
The data are monthly and covertheperiod 1959.1 to 1993.12. The federal funds rate, FF,
is a weighted average of rateson daily transactions for a group offederal funds brokers who
report to the Federal Reserve Bank ofNew York. The discount rate, DR, is the rate that is in
effect from the day that discount ratechanges are first announced. Because ofthe emphasis the
Fed places on seasonal plus adjustmentborrowing in its daily operating procedure, the commonly
usedmeasure ofnonborrowed reserves * total reserves, adjusted forreserverequirementchanges,
less seasonaland adjustment borrowing— is used. Thecurrent practiceofclassifying borrowing
into extended credit, seasonal and adjustmentborrowing began in May 1973. Prior to that, all
borrowing wasadjustment borrowing.
B. The DemandforBorrowedReserves
Although it has received relatively little attention [Clouse (1992, 1994)and Thornton
(1986)], thedemand forborrowed reserves has changed significantly. Figure 1 shows monthly
levels ofadjustment and seasonal borrowingand the spread ofthe federal funds rate less the
discount rate.13 There areseveral interesting featuresofthese data. First, during the period prior
to the mid-i960s the spread between the federal funds and discount rate was generally negative
‘Thesedata have been adjusted for two factors. The firstwas the adjustment borrowing by Continental Illinoisin MayandJuneof 1984 that
was initiallyclassified as extended credit borrowing. Thesecond is the $22.6 billionovernight borrowing by theBankof New Yorkon November
21, 1985, However, these adjustments do not alter the qualitativeconclusions reached in this paper.Identifying the Liquidity Effect: The Case ofNonborrowed Reserves Page 8
and the level ofborrowingwas small. The discount window was open in the sense that a bank
whowished to borrowobtained funds. RegulationA, which governed discounts and advances,
stated that borrowing at thewindow was a privilegeofmembership and not a right and that
borrowing to make a profit, by re-lending at a higherrate, was expressly forbidden. The Fed
arguedthat banks were reluctant to borrow, but it is unclear whether theirreluctance was
inherent orinduced by administrative oversight. In any event, when the funds rate reached the
level ofthe discountrate, banks would turn to thediscount window. Consequently, the discount
rate was an effectiveceilingforthe funds rate. In the mid- 1 960s,however, theadministration of
thediscount window changed. Requests to borrow were sometimes denied. From that period
forward,the funds rate generally traded abovethe discount rate.
Second, it is clearthat the importanceofadjustmentborrowing has shifted dramatically in
the lastdecade orso, both absolutely and relative to seasonal borrowing. Forexample, the ratio
ofseasonal to adjustment borrowing was only 0.048 during thefirst yearofthe new program,
compared with 2.128 during the final yearofthe sample. Finally, thereare markedchanges in
relationship between the spread and adjustmentborrowingover the period.
Becauseof themarked difference in thedemand forseasonal and adjustment borrowing
and the markedchangein thecomposition ofseasonalplus adjustment borrowing, attention is
focused on adjustmentborrowing. To investigatechanges in thebehavior ofadjustment
borrowing, the following equation,
(12) AB, = + ô1sp + ô2sp~+ ~Identifying the Liquidity Effect: The Case of Nonborrowed Reserves Page 9
was estimated. The spread between the federal funds and discountrates, i.e., FF-DR, is denoted,
sp. The squared spread is included to capture potential nonlinearities in the borrowingfunction
[Polakoff (1960), Clouse (1990) and Peristiani (1991)]. To see how wellthe economic variables
explain the behaviorofadjustmentborrowing, estimates of Equation 12 arecompared with those
of a simple univariate time-series model ofborrowing,
(13) AL?, = +
where ~= 0(L) ,1
= u1 and where0(L) is the polynomial, 00 + 0,L + 02L2
+ ... + 0kLk~in the lag
operator, L, i.e., LE~ =
Estimates ofEquations 12 and 13 are presented in Table 1 for several sample periods,
along with estimates of an equation that encompasses them. A briefdescription ofwhy these
periods were chosen and the average level ofadjustmentborrowing during eachis presented at
the bottom ofthe table. The importanceofeconomic variables in determining the level of
borrowing changedsignificantly over the period. Duringthe period when thediscount ratewas
an effective ceiling forthe federal funds rate, theeconomic variables explain relatively little of
adjustmentborrowing and aredominated by thetime-series model. The economic variables
become more important in explaining the behaviorofadjustment borrowing during the next two
periods and the economic variables dominate the time-series model during the periods that span
1977.9 to 1984.6. After 1984.6, very little ofthe behaviorofadjustment borrowing is explained
by either theeconomic ortime-series model.
Ifthe relationshipbetween nonborrowed reserves and interest rates is due to the liquidity
effect, it should be the strongest during the first period and the last two periods and the weakestIdentifying the Liquidity Effect: The Case ofNonborrowed Reserves Page 10
during the periods from 1965.3 to 1984.6. Ifthe relationship is due to thedefinition connecting
nonborrowedto borrowed reserves and the interest responsiveness ofborrowing,however, it
should be thestrongest during the middle periods and the weakest during theearly and latter
periods.
C. Prima Facie Evidence
Before turning to the VAR analysis, it is instructive to see what relatively simple analyses
suggest about the relative merits ofthe alternative hypotheses. First, we note that if the negative
association between nonborrowed reserves and the funds rate is due to theinterest sensitivity of
borrowing, thereshould be a strong negative association between I~NBR and i~AB and that this
relationship should have broken down in recent years, as adjustment borrowing has become
smaller and less interest sensitive. That this is exactlywhat happens is shown in Figure 2, which
shows 60-month movingcorrelations between L~FF and L~NBR and -~BR,respectively. Not
only is there a very closecorrespondence between these correlations, but thecorrelation between
the fund rate and NBRs falls offdramaticallyin mid-1984, as does the correlationbetween the
funds rateand adjustment borrowing.
It was arguedpreviously that the Fed operates in such a way as to offset changes in
seasonal plus adjustment borrowing. This would be true ofall changes in borrowing, even those
that are not associated with changes in the ratespread. To investigate this, the equation,
(14) LXNBR, = + ô1iXsp, + ô2i~sp,2
+ Ô3A(AB + SB), +
was estimated. Estimates ofEquation 14 arepresented in Table 2 forthe entire sample and the
previously-used sample periods. Estimates ofô~ are negative over the entire period and foreachIdentifying the Liquidity Effect: The Case of Nonborrowed Reserves Page 11
ofthesample periods. Moreover, generally they are not significantly different from -1.
Furthermore, as might be expected ifthe definition hypothesis is correct, the adjusted R2
aregenerally larger during the periods when the economic variables explain adjustment
borrowing ratherwell. In any event, the fact that estimates of ô3 are very close to, and frequently
not significantly different from -1, supports the notion that, at a monthly frequency atleast, the
Fed tends to offset nearly all ofthe change in seasonal plus adjustment borrowing. Moreover, it
appears that the Fed essentially behavedthis way during the entire period.
Given this result, it is important to see whether there is a significant relationshipbetween
nonborrowed reserves and the funds rate, conditional on the relationship between borrowing and
nonborrowedreserves. Iftherelationship between nonborrowed reserves and the funds rate is
due to the definition linking borrowedand nonborrowed reserves, then adding borrowed reserves
to a regression ofthe funds rate on nonborrowed reserves, should eliminate the connection to
nonborrowed reserves. Consequently, the equation,
(15) LxFF, = + p1L~NBR,± M21~AB,+ p3~SB1
+
wasestimated, with and withoutthe restrictions ~i
2
= p3
= 0 and with and without ~= 0~ , + u~.
The results, reported in Table 3, show that when the changein borrowing is included, the strong
contemporaneous negativerelationship betweennonborrowed reserves and the funds rate
disappears. Again, these results are consistent with the definition, but not the liquidity effect,
hypothesis.Identifying the Liquidity Effect: The Case ofNonborrowed Reserves Page 12
III. VARs And the Identification ofMonetary Policy
While some may find theprinzafacie evidence convincing, others will not. They will
contend that the above results merely show that there is a significant, negative contemporaneous
correlationbetween borrowedand nonborrowedreserves which makes it difficult to identify the
effect ofchanges in nonborrowed reserves on the funds rate. They will argue that this points to
the need to identify exogenous shocks to jointly-determined endogenous variables like borrowing
and NBR using a systems approach.’4 In particular, it is important to identify exogenous policy
innovations that could result in a liquidity effect.
A. Monetary Policyand VAR Innovations
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1991, 1992a,b) and Christiano, Eichenbaumand Evans
(1994a,b) argue that they haveidentified structural policy shocks by imposing a particular Wold
causal ordering on a VAR model that utilizes nonborrowed reserves as the monetary policy
variable. Theiridentification criterion is whetherornot other variables in the system respond to
a policy innovation in a mannerconsistent with economic theory. Specifically, they argue that
theCholesky decomposition that they havechosen identifies policy shocks becauseinnovations
to NBR initially reduce the fundsrate, raise output, increase total reserves and so on and so forth.
B. The VAR Evidence
This section presents evidence from theVAR model ofChristiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (1994a,b) as modified by Pagan and Robertson (1995). Pagan and Robertson’s preferred
model has six variables: real GDP, Y, theprice level, P. the commodityprice index,CP,
nonborrowed reserves, NBR, the federal funds rate, FF, and total reserves, adjusted forreserve
~Notethat because ofthe definition, NBR = TR - BR,thereare at most two independent shocksto thesethree variables.Identifying the Liquidity Effect: The CaseofNonborrowed Reserves Page 13
requirementchanges, TR. In theirspecification all variables except FF are in logs. However,
using logs distorts the linear relationshipbetween total, borrowedand nonborrowed reserves.
Hence, in the analysis that follows, all variables are in levets. In addition, borrowed reserves is
used in place oftotal reserves. [Theappendix shows that the use ofnon-log dataand the
substitution ofborrowed for total reserves has virtually no effect on Pagan and Robertson’s
results.] Following Pagan and Robertson, 14 lags were usedwhen the VARs were estimated
over theentire period. When the VARs were estimatedover shorter samples, the lag order was
six.
Figure 3 shows threeIRFs based upon estimates over theentire sampleperiod, two for
innovations to nonborrowedreserves to the federal funds rate from two different causal
orderings. The one analogous to that used by Pagan and Robertson {Y, P. CP, NBR, FF, BR) is
black, here and elsewhere. The IRF when borrowedreserves precedes NBR, i.e., {Y, P. CP, BR,
NBR, FF}] is red, and theIRF when the positions ofborrowed and nonborrowed reserves are
switched, i.e., {Y, P, CP, BR, FF, NBR}, is blue. The 90 percent confidence bands forthe Pagan
and Robertson ordering arepresented as blackdashed lines.
The IRFforthe ordering used by Pagan and Robertson is nearly identical to theone they
report, and suggests a statistically significant and economically important liquidity effect.
However,when BR precedes NBR in the Cholesky ordering the results change dramatically; the
liquidity effect forNBR all but disappears. Furthermore, IRFofNBR-FF forthe Pagan-
Robertson ordering is essentially themirror image ofthe IRFofBR— FF when the Cholesky
ordering is {Y, P. CP, BR, FF, NBR}.
These results suggest thepossibility that the effect of an innovation to NBR on the fundsIdentifying the Liquidity Effect: The Case ofNonborrowed Reserves Page 14
rate is due to the definition which links these reserve measures rather than to the liquidity effect.
These results should not be taken as evidence against theliquidity effect, however. The
sensitivity ofthe IRFs to changes in the causal ordering merely suggests that there is a
contemporaneouscorrelation between borrowed and nonborrowed reserves that is not accounted
forby imposinga recursive structure. Moreover, the fact that the IRFof BR— FF is the mirror
image of NBR-~ FF whenthe positions ofthese variables in the ordering is swapped, merely
demonstrates that an increase in nonborrowed reserves has thesame effect on the fundsrate as an
upward shift in the borrowing function, i.e., an increase in f3 in Equation 3. This is required by
the reserve model.
How can the IRFs be used to identify theliquidity effect? Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (1994a,b) suggest that identification canbe achieved by seeing whether the other IRFs
from NBR behave in a manner consistent with theirperception ofhow money affectseconomic
activity. Given theapparent lackofagreementand understanding ofhow monetary policy
impulsesare transmitted through theeconomy, however, this would not seem to be a useful,
objective identifying criterion.’5 Forone thing,it would lead those whobelieve that monetary
policy actions are transmitted to the economythrough theireffect on interest rates to dismiss
specifications that do not producea liquidityeffect. 16
In any event, this criterion is not useful in this instance becausethe IRFs for different
causal orderings are very similar. Figures 4 - 6 show all ofthe 36 IRFs forthe threeCholesky
orderings in Figure 3. BR has been replaced with -BR, so that the IRFs forNBR and BR can be
‘Forexample, see the conference proceedingsoftheFederal Reserve BankofSt. Louis ([Federal Reserve BankofSt. Louis (1995).
it is wellknown that different Cholesky orderings can give riseto quite different IRFs. It is also wellknown that thereare manycompeting
theories ofhowmonetary policy affects theeconomy. Consequently, it is difficultto see howthis approachofidentificationcan beofuse.Identifying the Liquidity Effect: The CaseofNonborrowed Reserves Page 15
compared more easily. Acomparison ofrow three in Figures 4 and 5 shows that the response of
output, prices,and commodity prices to innovations in -BR orNBR are very similar. While
Figure 6 shows that having -BR precede NBRin theCholesky ordering alters the effect ofan
innovation to NBR on Y,P and CP, the results arecloser to what theory would suggest, i.e.,
output and prices initially rise, but are not affected in the long run. The response that is most
severely damaged by the changingtheCholesky ordering is the liquidity effect.
The identifyingcriterion suggested here is to see whether theIRF for NBR — FF changes
over periods ofchanges in the demand forborrowed reserves in a mannerconsistent or
inconsistent with theliquidity effect hypothesis. Ifthe IRF suggests that the liquidityeffect is
largerand more persistentduring periods when borrowingis small and relatively interest
insensitive and smaller during periods when borrowing is large and relatively interest sensitive,
one can conclude that the IRFs reflect a liquidity effect. If, however, the reverse is true, one must
conclude that the relationship is largely definitional.
IRFs forvarious periods corresponding to the periods presentedin Table 1 are presented
in Figures 7 - 11. In every case,the general results discussedforthe three IRFs based on the
entire period arereplicated foreachofthe shorter periods. More important foridentifying the
liquidity effect, however, theIRFs for NBR based on the Pagan and Robertson causal ordering
reveal a very small and statisticallyinsignificant liquidityeffect during periods when borrowing
was small and interest insensitive: 1959. 1-1965.2 [Figure 7] and 1984.6-1993.12 [Figure 11].
The “liquidity effect” is largeand statistically significantonly during periods when the
relationshipbetween adjustment borrowing and thespread between thefunds and the discount
rates is relatively strong [Figures8-10]. Indeed, the IRFs suggest that therelationship betweenIdentifying the Liquidity Effect: The Case ofNonborrowed Reserves Page 16
NBR and the funds rate is the strongest during theperiod when theeconomic model dominates
the time-series model ofborrowed reserves [Figure 10]. The results in Figures 7 - 11 are
consistent with the definition hypothesis ofthe relationshipbetween NBR and the funds rate, but
not with the liquidity effect hypothesis. Indeed, theevidence suggests that theinnovations to
nonborrowed reserves reflect the Fed’s attempt to offset the effect ofchanges in thedemand for
borrowed reserves. Innovations to nonborrowed reserves when borrowing is small result in a
small and spasticallyinsignificant change in the funds rate. Thus, the evidence suggests that the
liquidity effect is nil.
IV. SummaryandConclusions
The liquidityeffect is thought to play a prominent role in the transmission ofmonetary
policy actions to theeconomydespite the factthat, until very recently, theempirical support for it
was scant. Recently,Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992ab), Christiano, Eichenbaumand
Evans(1994ab) and Strongin (1995) and Pagan and Robertson (1995) have reportedfinding a
statistically significant and economically relevant liquidity effect using nonborrowed reserves.
This paper investigates the liquidity effect using nonborrowed reserves as theindicator of
monetary policy, pointing out that the negative relationship betweennonborrowed reserves and
the federal funds rate found in the datacould be due either to theexistence or absence ofthe
liquidity effect. We then point out that it is possible to differentiate between these alternative
explanations ofthe databy seeing how the relationshipbetween nonborrowed reserves and the
federal funds ratevaries with shifts in the demand forborrowed reserves. Specifically, if the
negative association between nonborrowed reserves and the funds rate is due to the liquidity
effect, it should get stronger the smaller and less interest sensitive the demand forborrowedIdentifying the Liquidity Effect: The Case ofNonborrowed Reserves Page 17
reserves. Alternatively, ifthe relationship is due to an absenceofa liquidity effect and the
definition that links nonborrowedto borrowedreserves, it should get weakerthe smaller and less
interest sensitive the demandfor borrowed reserves.
Both relatively simple single-equationstatistical analyses and systems VAR evidence
suggests that the negative association between the funds rate and nonborrowed reserves varies
positively with the interest sensitivity ofborrowing. These results suggest that the liquidity effect
is weak and perhaps nil, even when nonborrowed reserves are used as theindicatorof monetary
policy. Hence the failure to find evidence ofa liquidity effect does not depend on the monetary
variable used to proxy formonetary policy shocks as Pagan and Robertson (1995) suggest. There
is little evidenceofa liquidityeffect ifthe monetary base, Ml, total reserves ornonborrowed
reserves are used as the monetary policy indicator.
In addition, the results presentedhere suggest that thepuzzle ofthe vanishing liquidity
effect since the early 1980s, that Pagan and Robertson (1995) reportedand Christiano (1995)
confirmed, is really a puzzle about why banks have shunned the discount windowsince the mid-
1980s. Clouse (1990, 1994) hassuggested that the dramaticshift in banks’ demand forborrowed
reserves is due to an increase in thereluctance oflarge institutions to be seen at the discount
window in the wake ofthe largediscount windowborrowing by Continental Illinois. While this
explanation may be incomplete, the timing ofthedramatic decline in the demand foradjustment
borrowing coincides with theproblem bank’s very largeborrowing atthe discount window.Identifying the Liquidity Effect: The Case of Nonborrowed Reserves Page 18
APPENDIX
The purpose ofthis appendix is to show that Pagan and Robertson’s(1995) results are not
significantly affectedwhen two modifications are made. This first is to replacethe logged
variables with variables in levels. The second is to replace total reserves with borrowed reserves.
The first is done by comparing the IRFs for NBR —‘ FF using both loggedand level datawhere
the Cholesky ordering is {Y, P, CP, NBR, FF, TR}, presented in Figure A.l. While only the
results forthe IRFs forNBR—FF are presented here, the results hold up forall possible IRFs
which these models generate.
The second is done by comparing the IRFs for NBR — FF using level data and alternative
models using TR and BR. A comparison ofthese IRFs is not presentedbecause they were
identical. While initially surprised by this result, furtherreflection suggests that it is a necessary
consequence ofthe fact thedefinition, NBR = TR - BR, means that there areat most two
independent innovations to these three variables. The system with NBR and TR contains the
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R~ 0.282 0,950 0.955 0674 0856 0.888 0.925 0.932 0.959 0612 0)59 0.703 0.777 0.516 0.789 .0.024 0.087 0.064 0195 0081 0.189









$89~ 2104’ 24.84’ 0001 4.04~
‘Indicates significance atthe 5 percentlevel. Absolutevalue oft-statistics in parentheses.
1959.1 -65.2: Periodwhen the discountwindowwas“open” in that banks thatcame tothe windowwith therequiredcollateral were not refusedloans. Duringthis period, thediscount ratewasaneffectiveceilingfor thefederal funds rate. The
averagelevel ofadjustment borrowing was 80.326 billion,
1965.3 * 73.4 Endof “open”discount windowpolicy to thebeginnirg oftheseasonal and extendedcredit borrowing programs. The averagelevel ofadjustment borrowing was 80.605 billion.
1973.5 - 77.8 Beginningofseasonal andextended credit borrowing programs to the beginning ofa rapid increase in theuseofthediscount windowfor adjustment borrowing. The averagelevel ofadjustment borrowing was 80.646 billion.
1977.9 80.12 Period ofvery high averagelevelofadjustment borrowing. Theaveragelevelofadjustment borrowing was $1,002 billion.
1981.1 - 84.6 Periodendswith adramaticdecline in adjustment borrowing relative tothe spreadbetweenthefederal fundsrateand the discount ratefirst suggestedby Clouse (1990). The averagelevelofadjustment borrowing was 80.792
billion.
1984.7-89.12 This periodbeginsandendswith what appearto bedramaticdeclines in theuseofthe discount windowfor adjustment boamwing Theaverage levelofadjustment borrowing was 80.326 billion.
1990.1.93.12 This periodbeginswith what appearsto be asignificantdropinthe use ofthe discount windowfor adjustment purposes. The averagelevel ofadjustment borrowing was $0.13 I billion.Table 2: EstimateofEouation 14
Period










































































DW --- --- 2.25 1 2.665 2.243 2.203 --- ---
Wald test 10,824* 1.292 0.495 0.080 1.978 0.735 7.438* 0.000





























R2 0.082 0.180 0.307 0.340
DW 1.356 — 1.601 ---
*Jndicatessignificance atthe5 percent level. Absolute value oft-statistics in parentheses.Figure 1: Seasonal and Adjustment Borrowing and the Federal
Funds - Discount Rate Spread
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Figure 7: Impulse Response Functions - 59.1 to 65i
BR -> FF {Y,P,CP,BR,FF,NBR}
NBR -> FF {Y,P,CP,BR,NBR,FF}
‘NBR -> FF {Y,P,CP,NBR,FF,BR}






Figure 8: Impulse Response Functions - 59.1 to 73.4














Figure 9: Impulse Response Functions - 73.5 to 84~6
NBR -> FF
{YPICP,BR,NBR,FF}
BR -> FF {Y,P,CP,BR,FF,NBR}










Figure 10: Impulse Response Functions - 77.9 to 84.6



















NBA -> FF {Y,P,CP,NBR,FF,BR}
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